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RECENT DECISIONS
local law and the rules pertaning to professional practice, a mutual
agency relationship . . . exists between the members of a professional
service organization .... -54 Colorado law provides that such a relation-
ship does not exist during a period when the professional corporation
maintained professional liability insurance which the group in the instant
case did.55
The importance of the instant case lies in its first method of neutral-
izing the 1965 regulations - ruling them an invalid exercise of the
legislative function. The difference between legislation and legitimate
interpretation in many instances is one of degree, and consequently it
is sometimes hard to make the distinction. But here the applicable
Treasury regulations seem clearly to have passed beyond the field of
interpretation.
Already the instant case has received approval from the Ohio District
Court which ruled the regulations concerning professional associations
invalid both on the grounds that they ignored the corporate charter of
the organization and that they were not consistent with either judicial
precedent or sound tax policy.56
Before the Second World War the medical and legal professions were
usually organized in small partnerships. But as the population began
to flow towards the urban centers and the need for specialization grew,
professional men realized the need for group practice and organized in
corporate-like structures including business trusts and common law
associations.5" In Pelton58 the government recognized this change in or-
ganization and taxed such groups as corporations. If these groups
decided to offset the loss resulting from corporate taxation by estab-
lishing pension and profit-sharing plans and if eventually the states
adapted their corporate codes to accommodate these groups, the federal
government should respect these decisions.
THOMAS A. HARNEY
JOINT TORTFEASORS: CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY BETWEEN CONCUR-
RENTLY NEGLIGENT DEFENDANTS DENIED.-Plaintiff was injured in a col-
lision between an automobile in which he was a passenger and a truck
driven by defendant. Defendant sought to implead the driver of the
automobile alleging he was grossly negligent and should be liable to
defendant for any judgment plaintiff recovered. Held, defendant had
'Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(4)(1965).
'Rule 265 I(G), Colo. R. of Civ. Proe.
'O'Neil v. United States, 68-1 USTC (1968).
'Ray, The "New Look" For Professional Corporations and Associations, 51 A.B.A.J.
882 (1965).
"Pelton v. Commissioner, supra note 14.
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no right of contribution or indemnity against the third party defendant,
even if he was grossly negligent and defendant was only ordinarly
negligent. Panasuk v. Seaton, 25 St. Rptr. 16 (D. Mont. 1968).
In contemporary tort law tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable
in four general situations:' (1) where two or more persons act in concert
and thereby harm the plaintiff,2 (2) where two or more persons each
violate a common duty to the plaintiff and thereby harm him, 3 (3)
where the plaintiff is simultaneously injured by two persons who are
not acting in concert 4 and (4) where a legal relationship produces
vicarious liability.5 The distribution of losses between tortfeasors jointly
and severally liable is regulated by the principles of contribution and
indemnity. Contribution is the right of one who has discharged a common
liability to recover a pro rata portion of the judgment from his joint
tortfeasor.6 Indemnity is the right of one who has satisfied the judgment
to recover the entire amount from his fellow joint tortfeasor.7
The orthodox common law rule prohibits contribution between joint
tortfeasors.5 Orthodox indemnity doctrine permits indemnity only in
cases of vicarious liability.9 Montana adheres to the orthodox rules in
both respects"° and therefore, under the doctrine of Erie R. R. Co. v.
Tompkins,"' the Federal District Court in the instant case was obliged
to rule at it did.'2
Apparently,' 3 the rule prohibiting contribution between joint tort-
'See generally, PROSSER, LAW Or TORTS 258-264 (3d ed. 1964) (hereinafter cited as
PROSSER).
2RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
-Id. § 878.
,'Id. § 879.
6RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
'Parten v. First Nat'l. Bank and Trust Co., 204 Minn. 200, 283 N.W. 408, 412 (1938).
7U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Williams, 148 Md. 289, 129 A. 660, 664 (1925).
8PROSSER 273.
'Sherk, Common Law Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 7 ARIZ. L. REV. 59, 64
(1965).
"°The Montana Supreme Court has stated, "One of several wrongdoers cannot shift
any part of his liability to a fellow wrongdoer although he has paid the entire judg-
ment." Variety Inc. v. Hustad Corp., 145 Mont. 358, 368, 400 P.2d 408, 414 (1965).
The Montana Supreme Court ruled indemnity was available to a lessee as against a
lessor upon proper proof of facts. A small boy, who was a patient at a hospital, was
burned by a faulty electrical switch on a television set the hospital leased. The boy
recovered judgment from the hospital. The hospital sued the lessor of the television
equipment and recovered. Crosby v. Billings Deaconess Hospital, 426 P.2d 217 (Mont.
1967).
"Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
"See generally, Comment, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution In The Federal
Courts, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 123 (1965).
"3The Highwayman's Case, Evert v. Williams (1725), 9 L. Q. REV. 197 (1893) suggests
the principles underlying Merryweather v. Nixon (1799). One highwayman sued
another to account for their plunder. The bill was dismissed. Counsel for both
parties were reprimanded for bringing contempt on the court. One party was sub-
sequently executed and the other deported to a penal colony.
[Vol. 29
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feasors was first enunciated in Merryweather v. Nixon.14 A judgment
had been rendered against two joint tortfeasors in a conversion action
and execution had been levied against one of them. He was nonsuited
in an action for contribution. At that time, tortfeasors could be joined
only if they acted in concert,' which meant they had to have acted
intentionally. That is, the two tortfeasors must have previously joined
in planning to commit a tort against a third party. Such conduct is
morally at fault in the classical sense in that a near criminal element
of intentional conduct is involved. Thus, the moral fault of each must
have been salient.
There were two possible bases for the decision in Merryweather v.
Nixon, and each was dependent upon the intentional moral-fault prin-
ciple. The first basis was that when two wrongdoers were equally at
fault, the law would not aid one of them to the detriment of the other.' 6
The second was the theory that the risk of entire liability would deter
individuals from combining to commit intentional torts.'7 Clearly the
no-contribution rule was intended to discourage the morally reprehen-
sible conduct found in such torts. Earlier English and American de-
cisions applied the rule in this limited type of case.' 8
The advent of liberal joinder rules changed the meaning of "joint
tortfeasor."' 9 Two individuals could now be joined if their simultaneous
but independent negligence injured the plaintiff.2 0 The original bases
for the no-contribution rule became inapplicable in many situations.
An individual whose negligence occurs contemporaneously with that
of another is clearly not as morally at fault in the classical sense as one
who engages in intentional conduct. Nevertheless, the courts continued
to apply the rule. 2' The result was a tortfeasor might escape liability
even though his negligence contributed to the plaintiff's damages.
A plethora of exceptions developed due to dissatisfaction with this
result. Contribution has been allowed for court costs 22 and counsel fees2 3
"1101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). See Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly
Charged with Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixon, 12 HARv. L. REV. 176 (1898).
'
5PRossER 260.
161d. at 273.
"7Comment, Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 123, 124 (1965).
"SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS 86 (6th ed. 1942); Baily v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859);
Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218 (1870 ; Reath, Contribu,tion Between
Persons Jointly Charged with Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixon, 12 HARV. L. REV.
176, 180 (1898).
"'PRossER 261.
Union Stock Yards v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co., 196 U. S. 217 (1905); Pidelity
& Cs. Co. of N. Y. v. Chapman, 167 Ore. 661, 120 P.2d 223 (1941); Cain v.
Quannah Light and Ice Co., 131 Okla. 27, 267 P. 641 (1928).21See Comment, Toward A Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 123 (1965); Comment, Adjusting Losses Among Joint Tortfeasors
in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE L. J. 964 (1958).
2Fakes v. Price, 18 Okla. 413, 89 P. 1123 (1907).
'Licht v. Klipp, 213 Iowa 1071, 240 N.W. 722 (1932).
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incurred in defense of a tort action. One court distinguished between
passive and active negligence and stated as dicta that contribution or
indemnity might be available to the passively negligent tortfeasor.24
Another court allowed contribution between two joint tortfeasors en-
gaged in a joint undertaking and liable only by legal inference or in-
tendment. 25 One court ruled the no-contribution rule was not applicable
where the acts of the joint tortfeasor were not intentionally or morally
at fault and appeared to implicitly state indemnity would be available
in such a situation.2 6 Some states denied contribution between tort-
feasors but allowed it between their subrogees. 27
Classically, indemnity is appropriate only when liability is predicated
upon a legal relationship between the tortfeasors and the indemnitee
is not at fault . 2  However, the movement to create exceptions to the
no-contribution rule found expression in an effort to broaden application
of the indemnity rule.29 Today the indemnity concept has been expanded
to include some cases involving concurrently negligent tortfeasors.30
It has thus become a difficult undertaking to determine when in-
demnity applies.31 The courts frequently state that if the parties are
not equally at fault, and if one party's negligence is the primary, active
and proximate cause, whereas the other's negligence is only secondary,
passive and remote, then a right of indemnity exists in favor of the
latter.32 A more generalized statement is that the " . . . duty to indem-
nify will be recognized in cases where community opinion would consider
that in justice the responsibility should rest upon one rather than the
other. "
33
The leading case in this area is United Air Lines Inc. v. Weiner. 4
United's plane was involved in a mid-air collision over Nevada with an
Air Force jet trainer. An Air Force student pilot had been engaged in
an instrument descent with a hood enshrouding the canopy over his
cockpit. The trial court found four specific acts of negligence by United
Air Lines and thirteen by the United States.3 5 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled the parties were not in pari delicto and that the dis-
2 Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Swift & Co., 23 Ga. App. 346, 98 S.E. 256 (1919).
251obbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 A. 815 (1918).
20American Tel. & Tel. v. Leoegue, 30 Ill. App. 2d 120, 173 N.E.2d 737 (1961).
nGale Lumber Co. v. Bush, 227 Mass. 203, 116 N.E. 480 (1917).
2Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. op PA. L. REV. 130,
147 (1932). Crosby v. Billings Deaconess Hospital, supra note 11.
Sherk, Common Law Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 7 ARiz. L. REV. 59, 64
(1965).
'Id.
mPRossER 278; Sherk, supra note 30, at 64.
'2Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 187 F.Supp. 690, 693 (D. Mont. 1960).
Variety Inc. v. Hustad Corp., 145 Mont. 358, 368, 400 P.2d 408, 414 (1965).
13PaossFa 281.
3"335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964).
"Weiner v. United Air Lines, 216 F.Supp. 701, 706 (S. D. Cal. 1962).
(Vol. 29
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parity in the character of the fault was such as to warrant indemnity
in favor of United Air Lines.8 6
Indemnity has been sought in a number of recent cases involving
concurrent negligence in motor vehicle collisions. The overwhelming
majority of decisions have denied indemnity.37 However, only one of
the cases concerned a party who was grossly negligent and another who
was only ordinarily negligent, which was alleged to be the situation in
the instant case. 38 In that case, indemnity was denied because the court
felt a policy of allowing indemnity would inhibit out-of-court settle-
ments, protract litigation and place an unfair burden on injured parties.
This position was adopted in the instant case.8 9
Dissatisfaction with the doctrine of indemnity and the no-contribu-
tion rule has provoked a controversy involving conflicting policies. 40
Those favoring contribution among joint tortfeasors argue that funda-
mentally, tort liability should relate to moral fault.41 Moral fault is
here used in the more modern sense of social responsibility. The in-
tentional element is absent but in the judgment of society the conduct
of the given defendant resulted in the damage. Adherents of this
rationale maintain that individuals should not be allowed to create
risks and injure individuals, and then eschew the responsibilities. 42
Proponents of the common law rule advance essentially two argu-
ments. Since accidents are said to involve a complex of personal and
environmental factors unrelated to moral fault, they argue losses should
be distributed over society as a whole.43 Contribution, they assert, might
allow an effective loss distributor such as an insurance company to
shift part of the loss to a party incapable of distributing it throughout
society.44 For example, an insurance company might be held jointly
liable with an individual defendant. The insurance company would
satisfy the judgment and then seek and obtain contribution of a pro
rata share from the individual defendant. The individual defendant
"United Airline Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379, 402 (9th Cir. 1964).
'Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp., 141 F.Supp. 833 (N. D. Cal.
1956); Warner v. Capital Transit Co., 162 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1958); Roth v. Grey-
hound Corp., 149 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1957); See annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1963);
Comment, Adjusting Losses Among Joint Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68
YALE L. J. 964, 983 (1958).
'Jacobs v. Gen. Acci. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 14 Wis. 2d 1, 109 N.W.2d 462 (1961).
See annot, 88 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1963).
"Instant case at 24.
"James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L.
REv. 1156 (1941); Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54
HARv. L. REV. 1170 (1941); James, Replication, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1178 (1941);
Gregory, Rejoinder, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1184 (1941).
'HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 117-129 (Belknap Press Ed. 1963); Gregory, Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1170 (1941).
"Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1170,
1171 (1941).
"James,Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 1156 (1941).
"Id.
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would have no means of passing the loss on to society. The desirable
end of distribution of loss would be controverted to the extent of the
pro rata share. Proponents of the no-contribution rule also argue that
contribution would inhibit rapid and adequate compensation of plain-
tiffs, since the number of parties involved in settlement negotiations
would necessarily increase as would the complexity of problems, and
time-consuming litigation would be more likely.45 Furthermore, a tort-
feasor might be reluctant to settle because he might later be liable for
contribution if the plaintiff sued the other tortfeasor and recovered.16
A majority of jurisdictions now allow contribution. Seven juris-
dictions have negated the common law rule by judicial decision 47 and
twenty-two have abolished the rule by statute.48 A minority of twenty-
two still retain the common law no-contribution rule.49  The statutes
which provide for contribution have been drawn so as to resolve or
mitigate many of the objections against it. Generally, the statutes
provide for a pro-rata division of losses among joint tortfeasors. This
articulates the fault principle of tort law. 50 Some jurisdictions attempt
to protect the plaintiff's position by allowing contributions only among
tortfeasors joined by the plaintiff.51 The problem of liability after
settlement was originally governed by the rule that a joint tortfeasor
who settled was still liable for contribution if the plaintiff sued the other
AsId.
"James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 1156 (1941). The original Uniform Act provided the joint tortfeasor who
settled with the plaintiff might still be liable for contribution if the plaintiff sued
the other joint tortfeasor and recovered judgment. There was much dissatisfaction
with this rule. Therefore the present Uniform Act provides the joint tortfeasor who
settles is discharged from liability for contribution. REVISED UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION
AMoNo TORTFEASORS ACT, § 4 (1955). This rule has the merit of allowing a joint
tortfeasor to settle and close his files on the matter without having to concern him-
self with future contribution litigation. See generally, PROSSER, 273.
'"Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77
N.W.2d 23 (1956); Bedell v. Reagen, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Hendrickson
v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960); Goldman v.
Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928); Huggins v. Graves, 210 F.
Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
"8ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to 1009 (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6301-08
(1953); HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 246-10 to 16 (1955); S.D. CODE §§ 33.04A01-33.04A10
(1960); CAL. CIv. PROC. § 875-880 (West 1961); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-2011 to 2012
(1956); MISS. CODE ANN. § 335.5 (1957); N. Y. CIv. PRAC. § 1401; W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 5481-82 (1961); Ky. REV. STAT. § 412.030 (1962); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
2103-05 (Supp. 1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 16-24 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (Supp. 1967); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925 (1962); Mo.
STAT. ANN. § 537.060 (1953); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 53A-1 to 5 (1952); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to 18 (1954); N. D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to 04 (1960);
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 2082-89 (Supp. 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-6-1 to
11 (1957); TEX. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-627
(1957).
"OAlabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wyoming.
'0PRossER 278.
5"CAL. CwV. PROC. § 875-880 (West 1961); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-2011 to 2012 (1956);
MISS. CODE ANN. §'335.5 (1957); N. Y. CIV. PRAC. § 1501; W. VA. CODE ANN. §
5481-82 (1961).
[Vol. 29
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joint tortfeasor and recovered.5 2 There was much dissatisfaction with
this particular rule. 53 Therefore, the present Uniform Act provides
that a tortfeasor who settles out of court is discharged from any liability
for contribution. 54
There is a need for reforming the system of loss distribution be-
tween joint tortfeasors as it is effected by the common law no-contribu-
tion rule and the doctrine of indemnity. It seems undesirable to attempt
resolution of the problem by enlarging the operation of indemnity.
This would only create a labyrinth of exceptions and inhibit develop-
ment of a workable definition of the rights and duties of the parties.
Furthermore, extending indemnity to cases involving concurrently neg-
ligent tortfeasors would allow one of them to shift the entire loss to the
other due to a slight discrepancy in fault. This would contravene the
fault principle of tort law and would be inequitable. Likewise, it would
not further loss distribution, and a plaintiff's efforts to obtain a remedy
would be complicated and protracted by the presence of a third party.
The solution seems to be complete abrogation of the no-contribution
rule. The majority of judicial and legislative opinions support this
view. 55 The opponents argue that it is desirable to distribute losses
throughout society and that contribution restricts this process. If con-
tribution restricts loss distribution, then insurance companies would
seemingly be forced to bear fewer loss claims. Therefore insurance
companies should favor passage of contribution legislation. Yet as
several authorities have noted insurance companies are among the most
vigorous opponents of legislation allowing contribution.56 As noted,
the opponents of contribution also urge that allowing contribution un-
justly disadvantages the plaintiff, but contribution statutes can be
drawn to defeat or mitigate this objection.
Even if we assume the validity of the foregoing objections the
argument for contribution should still prevail. Tort law should relate
to the ethical mores of the community.57 A tortfeasor should be re-
sponsible for the damage he causes. This is the norm our society pres-
ently approves. A judicial redefinition of the bases of tort liability in
terms of socialized loss distribution would be contrary to the established
social norm. Only the legislature should provide for such a fundamental
change, and until the legislature acts, tort law should give a rational
and accurate definition of the rights and duties of parties based upon
the fault principle. The rule against contribution allows a joint tort-
52PROSSER 278.
wId.
5REVISED UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, § 4 (1955).
Supra notes 47 and 48.
5PROssER 275; Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV.
L. REv. 1170, 1177 (1941).
57HOLmEs, THE COMMON LAW 117-129 (Belknap :Press Ed. 1963).
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feasor's liability to be determined at the whim of a plaintiff.58 This is
irrational, inequitable and not in accord with the mores of the com-
munity.
DOUGLAS M. GREENWOOD
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT-SOLITARY CON-
FINEMENT-The prisoner was incarcerated in the California Correctional
Training Center at Soledad. He was placed in solitary confinement for 12
days. The cell, approximately 6' x 8', was filthy and unheated; it had no
interior lights, no facilities for personal hygiene, and no furnishings except
a toilet which flushed from the outside of the cell. For eight days the
prisoner was kept naked, for the other four days he was given a rough
pair of overalls to wear. He was denied adequate medical treatment
prior to, during, and after his confinement. The prisoner brought this
action for an injunction against such punishment and for monetary
relief. Held, confinement in a cell maintained in the foregoing condition
falls within the Eighth Amendment prescription against cruel and unusual
punishment. Permanent injunctive relief was granted but the claim for
monetary relief was denied. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.Supp. 674 (N.D.
Cal. 1966).
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
any punishment which is cruel and unusual.1 The scope of the Eighth
Amendment has expanded greatly since its adoption and today prohibits
punishments which were acceptable in former times. If the instant case
had arisen twenty years ago, it is likely that no relief would have been
granted because then society would not have considered such punishment
cruel and ususual.' But in 1966 standards of justice had changed and
the repulsive conditions attending the solitary confinement were found
intolerable to society and the punishment was held to be cruel and unusual.
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, which original-
ly appeared in England in the Laws of Edward the Confessor, can be
traced to the Magna Carta and to the English Bill of Rights.! The Eighth
Amendment, as originally adopted, was intended to be much broader than
the rule in England. For example, punishments allowed in England
under the Bill of Rights included dragging to the place of execution,
5'PROSSER 275.
"'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted."I U. S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2Compare the extreme facts in Louisana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U: S. 459
(1947) discused in text at note 14, infra.
834 MINN. L. REv. 134, 135 (1950) ; Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 371 (1910).
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